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WOJCIECH	DZIEDUsZYCKI	–	LVIV	PIONEER	 
OF	CONTEMPORARY	REsEARCH	ON	COGNITION
В. Дідушицький розглядав реальність світу як першопочаткову ідею для аналізу пізнання, і визначав піз-
нання як вторинне поле реальності. Він стверджував, що ми пізнаємо тільки явища речей – так звані сен-
сорні дані – через призму наших відчуттів. Він, однак, не заперечує існування базисних передумов цих явищ. 
Говорячи про реальність, він мав на увазі те, що зазвичай розуміється під цим терміном. Обмежуючи реа-
лізм пізнання контекстом феноменалізму, В.Дідушицький визначав свою теорію пізнання у руслі непрямого 
реалізму, однак він не заперечував, що ми можемо здобувати елементарні та специфічні знання. Таким чи-
ном, він поєднав арістотелівський реалізм із сучасною критикою пізнання декартово-кантівської парадигми.
Ключові слова: питання пізнання, пізнавальни реалізм, наука про пізнавання, В.Дідушицький.
В. Дидушицкий рассматривал реальность мира как первоначальную идею для анализа познания и 
определял познание как вторичное поле реальности. Он утверждал, что мы познаем только явления ве-
щей – так называемые сенсорные данные – через призму наших ощущений. Он, однако, не отрицает суще-
ствования базисных предпосылок этих явлений. Говоря о реальности, он имел в виду то, что обычно пони-
мается под этим термином. Ограничивая реализм познания контекстом феноменализма, В.Дидушицький 
определял свою теорию познания в русле косвенного реализма, однако он не отрицал, что мы можем 
получать элементарные и специальные знания. Таким образом, он соединил аристотелевской реализм с 
современной критикой познания декартово-кантовской парадигмы. 
Ключевые слова: вопросы познания, познавательной реализм, наука о познании, В.Дидушицький.
W. Dzieduszycki accepted the reality of the world at the starting point for reflections on cognition, and 
recognised cognition as a field secondary to the reality. He claimed that we cognise only the phenomena of things 
– so called sensory data – through our sensation. He did not, however, deny the existence of the basis of these 
phenomena. Declared that speaking of reality he is referring to what is commonly meant by this term. Limiting 
the realism of cognition to phenomenalism, Dzieduszycki placed his theory of cognition in the sphere of indirect 
realism, he did not deny, however, the belief that we are able to acquire common and necessary knowledge. Thus 
he combined Aristotelian realism with modern criticism of cognition in the Cartesian-Kantian paradigm.
Keywords: research on cognition, realist tradition, modern criticism of cognition, W. Dzieduszycki. 
Reflection on human cognition has as long history as philosophical thinking. In antiquity and the Middle 
Ages, research on cognition existed on the fringes of philosophy, as the latter focused on metaphysical issues. 
The cognitive science, called the theory of cognition or epistemology, emerged as a separate branch of phi-
losophy only in modern times. This resulted from researchers’ demand that each emerging system of knowl-
edge be preceded by a criticism of cognitive procedures. The subject	of	cognition, the object	of	cognition, as 
well as the sources	of	cognition	and ways	of	cognition	were to be subject to a critical examination. It was also 
proposed that a critical reflection on the criterion	of	the	truth	of	cognition be carried out [1]. 
Philosophical reflection of Wojciech Dzieduszycki, a professor of Lviv University from 1894 to 1909, be-
came an inherent part of this modern trend to seek legitimate cognitive structures of knowledge.
Wojciech Dzieduszycki (1848-1909), born in Jezupol (near Stanisławów, presently Ivano-Frankivsk), in 
Podolia; writer, philosopher, author of works on philosophy, aesthetics, history of culture, as well as politics 
and socio-cultural issues, professor of history of philosophy, ethics and aesthetics at Lviv Univeristy (1894-
1909). His teaching activities involved not only academic lectures but also numerous public lectures delivered 
in Lviv, Warsaw and Vienna. Dzieduszycki was regarded as an intellectual authority by his contemporaries, 
and was the most popular professor among Lviv students. He was considered one of the most original people of 
his era, surpassing his generation in terms of knowledge and versatility. Due to his fascination with antiquity, 
the cult of classicism and the Greek ideal of wisdom which he tried to convey to his contemporaries, the profes-
sor was given the nickname of «Podolian Athenian», as he was regarded as a sort of Greek, Socrates-like, sage. 
Dzieduszycki was also active in the politics, within the scope approved by the autonomy of Galicia in the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire. He sought economic and educational rights for the inhabitants of eastern Galicia. 
As a representative of the conservative party, Dzieduszycki was a deputy to the National Sejm in Lviv (1876-
1879) and to the State Council in Vienna (1879-1885 and 1895-1909), as well as minister for Galicia in the 
Vienna Government (1906-1907). This activity was stimulated by his vision of creating a multinational state, 
with the Jagiellonian empire being the model (these ideas were shared, among others, by Platon Kostecki, a 
Polish-Ukrainian poet). The professor died in Vienna and was buried in the family tomb near the Dominicans 
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church in Jezupol. His funeral was attended by politicians, scientists, academics, bishops and clergy of three 
religions coexisting in this land, as well as many local people.
Based on the observation of human cognitive activity, Dzieduszycki, in his academic works O wiedzy 
ludzkiej and Roztrząsania filozoficzne o podstawach pewności, emphasised the generally acknowledged fact 
that every human is capable of disinterested curiosity, that is of seeking knowledge for the sake of knowledge 
itself – regardless of the utility of this knowledge [2, p. 24]. He pointed out that many people feel such a strong 
need for disinterested knowledge that they sacrifice other goods for it [3, pp. 50–51]. Dzieduszycki discerned 
that mainly scholars, scientists, thinkers and artists tend to engage in the disinterested pursuit of knowledge. 
He noticed that discovery of new truth always brings joy mainly to this type of people [3, P. 51]. He stressed 
the necessity of scientific and artistic cognition in social life and its high importance making the status of the 
scholar highly valued in civilised countries [4, pp. 41–42]. 
1.	The	cognising	subject	–	obviousness	of	his/her	existence
As for the cognising person, Dzieduszycki adopted the Cartesian subjective starting point. He regarded 
the existence of the cognising subject as the basis for any cognition. However – unlike Descartes – he did not 
establish the certainty of his own existence starting with the fact of thinking (reasoning, cogito) but starting 
with the obvious fact of his own existence he ascertained that it is the existence of a spiritual being, ie. a being 
whose essence is to have a spiritual entity. 
He regarded purely abstract cognition, achieved with the use of concepts, as the highest level of human 
cognition. However, we do not grasp the fact of existence – neither of the existence of the cognising subject 
nor the existence of the cognised object – with the use of the abstract cognition, as Dzieduszycki claimed in 
line with the epistemological realism. We do not establish the fact of existence using reasoning but we seek it 
in the factuality of existence of the subject – a cognising human being, and in the obviousness of the cognised 
object – a being perceived as something that is cognised. Thus the existence is not subject to conceptualisa-
tion and thereby not subject to scientific cognition. The fact of existence is ascertained directly (not through 
concepts), as visually obvious. 
2.	The	object	of	cognition	–	what	do	we	cognise:	things	or	phenomena?
The case of cognitive realism becomes complicated when Dzieduszycki turns to the issue of the object of 
cognition. In this regard, his view differed considerably from the cognitive realism, according to which we 
cognise a thing through direct contact with it. He pursued the Cartesian tradition, derived from Augustinism 
[5, p. 276], which recognised that the primary area of investigation are the ideas contained in the mind of the 
cognising subject (later these ideas were defined as the data of our consciousness). He emphasised that it is 
our	consciousness: «Jest tedy rzeczą jasną, oczywistą i konieczną, że nie znamy i nie możemy znać nic innego 
nad nasze	myśli, nasze wyobrażenia i nasze uczucia. [...]. Cały świat, który znamy, jest jedynie sumą naszych	
wiadomości, czyli naszych [T.Z.’s emphasis] wyobrażeń, i o żadnym innym świecie nie wiemy zgoła i nie 
możemy wiedzieć» [4, p. 2]. 
The ideas which we cognise, called by him «our notions», reflect the phenomena occurring in the world. 
Like Kant, Dzieduszycki assumed that what we cognise are phenomena grasped cognitively through our no-
tions, differentiating between spiritual and sensory phenomena (or «sensory things» and «spiritual beings», 
which is close to the Cartesian dualism). Thus we cognise sensory or spiritual phenomena (or: external or 
internal phenomena) [4, p. 102]. 
However, contrary to the Platonic idealism, Dzieduszycki did not deny the existence of the basis of these 
phenomena, and thus the reality of the world, its existence. He believed that the things being the basis of phe-
nomena exist really and objectively and independently of the cognising subject. The objective existence of things 
is proved by real sensations («internal» and «external») received by the human mind from without. «External 
sensations» prove the existence of the material world, while the «internal sensations» – the existence of one’s self. 
 He claimed that phenomena can only occur in time. He regarded the existence of a phenomenon in time 
– both mental and sensory – as a criterion for the reality it. We obtain this criterion not through reasoning but 
through direct intuition. He considered the perception of time to be the domain of intuition. Unlike Kant, who 
claimed that time is a subjective category of mind, Dzieduszycki believed that time – understood as the inevi-
table succession of the past, present and future – is one of the common properties of phenomena. In line with 
the Christian interpretation, Dzieduszycki assumed that time was initiated by God [4, p. 145], and the existence 
of the world must occur in time. 
He pointed out the independence from the (really existing) space as a characteristic of spiritual phenomena: 
spiritual phenomena – that is acts of mind, feeling and will – occur in the soul, and the soul, being immaterial, 
does not occupy any space. The thought also does not occupy any space, because it exists in mind which does 
not occupy any space either (it is sensory phenomena that occur in space). Dzieduszycki regarded Kant’s view 
of subjectivity of time and space as having no basis in human experience [4, p. 145].
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Although he limited the reality of cognition to phenomenalism, Dzieduszycki did not deny the belief that 
we are able to acquire common and necessary knowledge. 
3.	sources	of	cognition	–	with	what	do	we	acquire	knowledge?
In his academic dissertations Dzieduszycki joined the discussion on the issue of ways of acquiring knowl-
edge, which was popular among scholars in the second half the 19th century. In his dissertations this issue 
concretised in the question: «Which of human cognitive faculties have a decisive part in the acquisition of 
knowledge?» Generally, the history of human thought was dominated by two contradictory positions: one 
stated that experience is the source of knowledge, while the other expressed a belief that reason is the source 
of knowledge. 
The Lviv scholar sought solution of this dilemma in philosophical systems of the ancient Greece. The anal-
ysis of positions and arguments of these systems led him to propose a thesis that the history of human thinking 
about cognition was determined by the epistemological position, established already in antiquity, which denied 
the legitimacy of extreme sensualism, ie. the position that impressions of the senses are the only source of hu-
man knowledge [6, p. 206]. Dzieduszycki considered that the view denying the legitimacy of extreme sensual-
ism contributed to strengthening the belief that sensory experience provides only the material for knowledge, 
not knowledge itself. In line with Plato, he stated that knowledge resulting solely from sensory experience 
is not a reliable knowledge. Neither is it the only knowledge that human beings can acquire. Such a position 
placed him in opposition to both pure intellectualism (apriorism) and pure empiricism (aposteriorism). At the 
same time, he combined cognitive apriorism with cognitive aposteriorism, which brought him, as a modern 
thinker, closer to the position of the Neo-Kantians. Contrary to empiricists and positivists, Neo-Kantians un-
derstood experience not as a simple reception of facts but as a complex product of mind. 
3.1. Experience put in order by reason: genetic empiricism
Dzieduszycki agreed with the Neo-Kantian view that experience is the effect of many cognitive powers. 
He believed that knowledge arises only when impressions of the senses have been put in order by reason [6, p. 
206]. Reasons for his belief in this respect were as follows: experience (empiria) is the source of knowledge, 
providing human thinking with content, but neither sensory experience alone (as empiricists claimed) nor rea-
soning alone (as rationalists wanted) can provide a reliable knowledge. This view, adopted by Dzieduszycki, 
is known as genetic empiricism.
The Lviv thinker recognised both sources of knowledge; he understood experience as both internal experi-
ence (introspection) and external experience (sensory experience). He regarded experience as the effect of not 
only sensory but also mental cognitive activities of a human being [4, pp. 4-7]. He pointed out that thanks to 
internal experience the subject cognises his/her own feelings and thoughts, while the external experience pro-
vides information on the phenomena of the sensory world. 
3.2. Intuition as an important source of knowledge 
In his research on cognition Dzieduszycki exhibited a high degree of innovativeness. He introduced intu-
ition as a source of knowledge supporting the senses and reason – two traditional sources of cognition. («Rodzaj 
wiedzy, której nie nabywamy ani za pomocą zmysłowego, ani za pomocą umysłowego doświadczenia, a który 
nam nie pozwala wątpić o istnieniu umysłowej czy raczej duchowej istoty u drugich ludzi, nazywają intuicją, 
i musimy zatem intuicję zaznaczyć jako trzecie	 źródło	 doświadczenia, obok dostrzeżeń zmysłowych i 
umysłowych [T.Z’s emphasis]») [4, p. 102]. 
Regarding intuition as a specific kind of mental experience [4, pp. 149-150], he associated it with the intel-
lect (and not with senses), and specifically with a specific «power» (ability) of the intellect as he considered 
conscience. It should be assumed that it will be an intellectual intuition – different from the sensory intuition, 
directly referred to the object experienced with the senses, but also different from discursive cognition [7, pp. 
306–308]. 
Dzieduszycki’s notion of intuition was in line with the thought of Thomas Aquinas [8, p. 94]. But we can 
also perceive a reference to J.G. Fichte’s idealism in this regard, for whom intellectual intuition was the start-
ing point of the whole system [9, pp. 544–548]. 
Claiming that intuition is the only source of reliable cognition, Dzieduszycki attributed to it the essential 
role in the process of discovering the fundamental truths of the world. Furthermore, he gave priority to intu-
ition in terms of genetics, recognising that intuition always preceded reasoning («[...] tylko ta intuicja zamienia 
wnioski rozumowe w pewniki, że ona zawsze poprzedza rozumowanie, i że ma swoje źródło w najgłębszej 
naszej istocie, zwróconej ku spełnianiu praktycznych, a nie teoretycznych zadań») [4, p. 102]. 
More precise interpretation of the role of intuition in Dzieduszycki’s system is complicated by the fact that 
he did not specify in what sense he uses this term, which, by the way, was a feature not only of his philosophi-
cal writings [10, p. 175]. 
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In the course of the history of human thinking the term «intuition» was given various meanings depending 
on the adopted concept of cognition. Aristotle showed two ways of intellectual exploration: discursive and in-
tuitive. However, he did not contrapose one way to another, pointing out that both are performed thanks to the 
same power – reason. Thomas Aquinas, apart from the discursive way of cognition, assumed non-discursive 
cognition – the intuitive cognition [11, pp. 37–51]. This cognition, characterised by directness and simplicity 
of perception, was considered by him as a basis for reasoning [12, pp. 897–901]. It follows from the fore-
going that Dzieduszycki’s position may be close to the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, in which the word 
«intuition» is to define the direct, simple and understanding perception of the object or phenomenon. Other 
statements of the Lviv thinker indicate that he also attributed many features of the Augustinian illuminism to 
intuition [13, pp. 353–355]. 
Dzieduszycki believed that thanks to intuition a human being finds out the truths revealed by God, which 
are: the belief in the existence of oneself and other human beings, the existence of the world, the existence of 
God and the validity of the moral law.
 
3.3. Another source of cognition: imagination
In addition to experience, reasoning and intuition, the Lviv scholar introduced another source of knowledge 
– imagination. The emphasis on imagination as a source of cognition may be considered as the impact of the 
contemporary trends in psychologism and literary modernism. 
Comparing imagination with reasoning, Dzieduszycki pointed out that there are two kinds of cognitive 
situations: those in which thinking (discourse) dominates the imagination, and those in which the imagination 
dominates the thinking. In line with the popular understanding, the dominance of reason over imagination was 
called by him reason. Interestingly, he attributed to reason – this Aristotelian virtue of virtues – the role of a 
brake on action, believing that excess of reason paralyses actions, limiting them to goals easy to be achieved 
[4, p. 37]. He perceived such a regularity especially in persons having faint imagination and mediocre intellect. 
The reverse situation – the predominance of imagination over reason – causes, as he claimed, that a person 
strives after unreasonable goals using unrealistic means. 
From this he drew the conclusion that reason plays its role well only when it is supported by a vivid imagi-
nation, as imagination enables diverse non-standard association of notions. Appreciating the role of imagina-
tion, he claimed that creative imagination must be endowed to both a brilliant artist and a person achieving 
results in terms of practical actions, creating new areas of reality, because thanks to imagination he/she can find 
such opportunities to act which will lead to accomplishment of the set goals. 
Dzieduszycki considered that beside creative activities – artistic and practical – also scientific and academic 
research requires imagination. He believed that in scientific and academic activities imagination allows formu-
lation of accurate hypotheses, which – verified by experience – will become scientific and academic theories. 
He claimed that it is mainly thanks to imagination that genius arises – both artistic and scientific/academic.
4.	Ways	of	cognition:	how	do	we	acquire	knowledge?
Dzieduszycki believed that two ways of human cognition – indirect cognition and direct cognition – are 
adjusted to two types of phenomena occurring in the world – sensory and spiritual. 
Sensory phenomena are cognised indirectly – through sensory impressions. This type of cognition occurs 
in natural sciences. Whereas the existence itself of objects (the properties of which we cognise indirectly, 
through sensations) is ascertained directly (without any mediation) [2, p. 59]. The sphere of spiritual phenom-
ena is subject to direct cognition [14]. These phenomena are dealt with by philosophy. In philosophy, which 
examines spiritual phenomena being specific to human beings, the direct cognition is applicable. According to 
Dzieduszycki, direct cognition – non-discursive (independent of reasoning), intuitive – concerns cognition of 
the own existence, the existence of things, the existence of God and immortality of the human soul [4, p. 101]. 
5.	The	criterion	of	reliability	and	truth	of	cognition:	really	existing	world
To search for the basis of reliable knowledge and the criterion of its truth is, in Dzieduszycki’s opinion, the 
task of philosophy. He recognised, however, that spontaneous ascertainment of the existence of the world, neces-
sary in practical life, is not sufficient in the sphere of philosophy, so he started to seek sanction confirming this 
spontaneous cognition. He deemed conscience to be such a sanction. At this point the term conscience appears 
in his explanation of cognition. Dzieduszycki introduced it without any justification and without specifying how 
he understood it. It seems that he based on the seriousness of this term sanctioned by religion, but he used it in a 
sense far beyond this role. Conscience became the basic category of his system, and the judgment of conscience 
was sanctioned as the ultimate criterion of the existence of other human beings and the existence of the world.
This strong emphasis on the absolute validity of conscience as a guarantor of reliability in every area of 
human life, and not only in terms of moral actions, indicates a search for such a source of cognitive certainty 
which would be able to resist widespread relativism. 
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Epistemological starting point for philosophical reflection, focused on the question of the nature of the rela-
tionship between the cognising mind and the world of space-time objects, indicates that Dzieduszycki’s views 
regarding the theory of cognition are placed within the modern, widely understood philosophy of subject and 
those systems of thought in which reflection starts with an analysis of cognitive states. 
6.	A	particular	type	of	cognition	–	philosophical	cognition
In the context of reflections on cognition, Dzieduszycki emphasised the specificity of philosophical cogni-
tion. He showed the distinctiveness of philosophical knowledge comparing it with the scientific knowledge. He 
noticed that the difference between a philosopher and a specialist in natural sciences lies in that a philosopher 
is not content to discover partial truths but tries to find out the nature of the truth [17]. 
Emphasising the non-utilitarian nature of the scientific cognition, Dzieduszycki stressed his opposition to 
the positivist conception of science as an area of human activity being at the service of utility [15, pp. 93–94]. 
Based on Plato’s understanding of science, he himself emphasised in it the disinterested pursuit of truth as a 
value in itself. Thus he emphasised the axiological value of science [16]. 
Dzieduszycki, in line with the realist tradition, accepted the reality of the world at the starting point for 
reflections on cognition, and recognised cognition as a field secondary to the reality [17]. He believed that the 
reality of the world, its existence independent of human beings, manifests itself in the form of real sensory 
and mental phenomena. He believed that the things being the basis of phenomena exist really and objectively 
and independently of the cognising subject. The objective existence of things is proved, in his opinion, by real 
sensations received by the human mind from without. External sensations prove the existence of the material 
world, while the internal sensations – the existence of one’s self. He claimed that we cognise only the phenom-
ena of things – so called sensory data – through our sensation. He did not, however, deny the existence of the 
basis of these phenomena. Dzieduszycki declared that speaking of reality he is referring to what is commonly 
meant by this term, and any divagations on the existence of the world cannot fall within the scope of serious 
philosophical reflection. Limiting the realism of cognition to phenomenalism, Dzieduszycki placed his theory 
of cognition in the sphere of indirect realism, he did not deny, however, the belief that we are able to acquire 
common and necessary knowledge. Thus he combined Aristotelian realism with modern criticism of cognition 
in the Cartesian-Kantian paradigm.
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